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# A Dual-Hypervisor for supporting multiple Trusted Execution Environments on Arm TrustZone

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# AGENDA

## 1 Isolation for multiple domains with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)

The need for reconciling virtualization with hardware-based security capabilities


## 2 A Dual-Hypervisor design for ARM TrustZone

Achieving virtualization of both secure and non-secure worlds with jointly-configured hypervisors with a limited overhead, small memory footprint and high predictability


## 3 A Safe, Secure and Hard Real-time software stack

A solution for next-generation autonomous systems

# Integrating multiple software components




# Multi-OS solution through virtualization



# Proposed HW solution – ARM TrustZone


TrustZone provides support for a hardware-based TEE by splitting computer resources between two execution worlds




Picture from [www.developer.arm.com](http://www.developer.arm.com)

# ARM TrustZone for ARMv7-A/R processor


Classical processor modes split into normal and secure plus a super privileged monitor mode



# The Dual-Hypervisor Design




# The **Future** Dual-Hypervisor Design






# Secure world is highly predictable




# Isolation boundaries of the Dual-Hypervisor design

- — Software-based boundary
- — Hardware-based boundary




# Potential application in the automotive field

Towards reducing #ECUs, integrating multiple ECU functionalities (i.e. software) within the same platform can be very challenging



# Potential application in the automotive field (2)


## Combining infotainment system with Autosar systems



- - - - Hardware-based boundary (e.g. Arm TrustZone)

- - - - Software-based boundary (based on hardware-assisted virtualization)


# Test case



# Benefits

- A **Dual-hypervisor** design can support multiple TEEs
- Leveraging **hardware-based isolation** achieving robustness
- **No single point of failure**
- **Limited overhead** for NS Guests w.r.t. single-hypervisor designs
- More **robustness** with regard to hyperjacking
- High **predictability** on executing trusted code

# Current and future works



Working towards a **Spin-Off!!**

# Hypervisor: main features



Address-Space Randomization


Control Flow Integrity (Armv-8.3 HW support)

Stack overflow protection

Secure boot for Virtual Machines

Several side-channel attacks mitigations

Dual-Hypervisor for strong MILS (see next slide)



Cache-coloring

Memory bandwidth

Bank-aware memory allocation

O(1) algorithm complexities (almost all)

Fixed-priority (RM/DM) and EDF scheduling

Resource reservation

Very low boot latency



Totally static

Off-line auto-generated configuration

MISRA-C 2012 compliant

Code prone for SIL3/4 certification

Safety guards for unpredictable SW

Low memory-footprint




# Current status

## Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ (ZCU102 board)



CPU	Quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 Dual-core ARM Cortex-R5
GPU	ARM Mali-400 MP2
FPGA	Zynq Ultrascale FPGA XCZU9EG (600K logic cells, 32Mb mem, 2520 DSPs)
Memory	PS 4GB DDR4 64-bit SODIMM w/ ECC PL 512MB DDR4 at 1200MHz / 2400Mbps DDR

## NVIDIA Jetson TX2



GPGPU	NVIDIA Pascal™, 256 NVIDIA CUDA® cores
CPU	HMP Dual Denver 2/2MB L2 + Quad ARM® A57/2MB L2
Memory	8 GB 128-bit LPDDR4 58.3 GB/s

## Targets

- ADAS
- Railway
- Industry 4.0



## Targets

- ADAS
- Autonomous driving
- Industry 4.0
- Robotics





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**THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION**

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