Abstract: One of the key points to take into account to foster effective introduction of AI planning and scheduling systems in real world is to develop end user trust in the related technologies. Automated planning and scheduling systems often brings solutions to the users which are neither “obvious� nor immediately acceptable for them. This is due to the ability of these tools to take into account quite an amount of temporal and causal constraints and to employ resolution processes often designed to optimize the solution with respect to non trivial evaluation functions. To increase technology trust, the study of tools for verifying and validating plans and schedules produced by AI systems might be instrumental. In general, validation and verification techniques represent a needed complementary technology in developing domain independent architectures for automated problem solving. This paper presents a preliminary report of the issues concerned with the use of two software tools for formal verification of finite state systems to the validation of the solutions produced by MrSPOCK, a recent effort for building a timeline based planning tool in an ESA project.

Abstract: The synthesis of flexible temporal plans has demonstrated wide applications possibilities in heterogeneous domains. We are currently studying the connection between plan generation and execution from the particular perspective of verifying a flexible plan before actual execution. This paper explores how a model-checking verification tool, based on UPPAAL-TIGA, is suitable for verifying flexible temporal plans. We first describe the formal model, the formalism, and the verification method. Furthermore we discuss our own approach and some preliminary empirical results using a real-world case study.

Abstract: We present two OBDD based model checking algorithms for the verification of Nash equilibria in finite state mechanisms modeling Multiple Administrative Domains (MAD) distributed systems with possibly colluding agents (coalitions) and with possibly faulty or malicious nodes (Byzantine agents). Given a finite state mechanism, a proposed protocol for each agent and the maximum sizes f for Byzantine agents and q for agents collusions, our model checkers return Pass if the proposed protocol is an ε-f-q-Nash equilibrium, i.e. no coalition of size up to q may have an interest greater than ε in deviating from the proposed protocol when up to f Byzantine agents are present, Fail otherwise. We implemented our model checking algorithms within the NuSMV model checker: the first one explicitly checks equilibria for each coalition, while the second represents symbolically all coalitions. We present experimental results showing their effectiveness for moderate size mechanisms. For example, we can verify coalition Nash equilibria for mechanisms which corresponding normal form games would have more than $5 \times 10^21$ entries. Moreover, we compare the two approaches, and the explicit algorithm turns out to outperform the symbolic one. To the best of our knowledge, no model checking algorithm for verification of Nash equilibria of mechanisms with coalitions has been previously published.