Abstract: Many software as well digital hardware automatic synthesis methods define the set of implementations meeting the given system specifications with a boolean relation K. In such a context a fundamental step in the software (hardware) synthesis process is finding effective solutions to the functional equation defined by K. This entails finding a (set of) boolean function(s) F (typically represented using OBDDs, Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams) such that: 1) for all x for which K is satisfiable, K(x, F(x)) = 1 holds; 2) the implementation of F is efficient with respect to given implementation parameters such as code size or execution time. While this problem has been widely studied in digital hardware synthesis, little has been done in a software synthesis context. Unfortunately the approaches developed for hardware synthesis cannot be directly used in a software context. This motivates investigation of effective methods to solve the above problem when F has to be implemented with software. In this paper we present an algorithm that, from an OBDD representation for K, generates a C code implementation for F that has the same size as the OBDD for F and a WCET (Worst Case Execution Time) linear in nr, being n = |x| the number of input arguments for functions in F and r the number of functions in F.

Abstract: We present two OBDD based model checking algorithms for the verification of Nash equilibria in finite state mechanisms modeling Multiple Administrative Domains (MAD) distributed systems with possibly colluding agents (coalitions) and with possibly faulty or malicious nodes (Byzantine agents). Given a finite state mechanism, a proposed protocol for each agent and the maximum sizes f for Byzantine agents and q for agents collusions, our model checkers return Pass if the proposed protocol is an ε-f-q-Nash equilibrium, i.e. no coalition of size up to q may have an interest greater than ε in deviating from the proposed protocol when up to f Byzantine agents are present, Fail otherwise. We implemented our model checking algorithms within the NuSMV model checker: the first one explicitly checks equilibria for each coalition, while the second represents symbolically all coalitions. We present experimental results showing their effectiveness for moderate size mechanisms. For example, we can verify coalition Nash equilibria for mechanisms which corresponding normal form games would have more than $5 \times 10^21$ entries. Moreover, we compare the two approaches, and the explicit algorithm turns out to outperform the symbolic one. To the best of our knowledge, no model checking algorithm for verification of Nash equilibria of mechanisms with coalitions has been previously published.